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unrest, conflicts and war

The ink had hardly dried on the joint statement issued in Ufa after the meeting between Prime Ministers Narendra Modi and Nawaz Sharif when accusations, recriminations, and even shooting across the Line of Control began. Not that such an upshot was entirely unexpected, given patterns seen in the past. The routine has included, following any statement of intent, phases of commentary and political wordplay from the respective establishments that would go around chest-thumping about short-sighted “victories” for either side. On the other hand, detractors would tend to nitpick about the absence of issues that matter, of course those that are dear to them, or cavil over the controversial clauses by overemphasising them. This pattern has just played out again. Added to this has been the recrudescence of cross-border incidents, resulting in casualties. This time, India has accused Pakistan of infiltration attempts in the Jammu sector, while Pakistan has complained that India sent in a drone and also started firing across the border. Attempts to follow the standard protocol for such situations, setting up conversations between the respective border security forces, for example, have also not been possible, according to India.
The cross-border incidents in themselves represent a major issue bilaterally. Hundreds of such incidents have occurred since both countries signed a ceasefire agreement in 2003, which are clearly violative of it. These then beg the question whether the agreement as it stands is a dead letter. While many of the violations have been a consequence of “infiltration bids” by insurgents aided by Pakistan Rangers, the present set of incidents clearly represent the political fallout of recriminations following the Ufa agreement, indeed conforming to the pattern of the recent past. Ideally, India and Pakistan should strengthen the 2003 agreement by negotiating a new and more robust ceasefire agreement. But even that would not do. The two governments must work toward a robust media and political strategy to explain any agreements — such as in Ufa — to its domestic political opposition and even the noisy media in order to cushion themselves from the theatrics that inevitably follow a thaw. It is more so in the case of Pakistan, where the civilian government has hardly any leeway in working out its relations with India given the overhang of the security establishment. It is unfortunate that within days of the Ufa statement, Sartaj Aziz, adviser on foreign affairs to Mr. Sharif, backtracked from the terms of the joint statement by reiterating the centrality of issues such as Kashmir, and came out with a litany of new complaints about “Indian interference”. Clearly, maturity and better management of the domestic constituencies and core establishments are sorely needed, especially on the Pakistani side.